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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The last two decades have witnessed a dramatic change, from 
almost total isolation to rapidly expanding involvement, in the Soviet 
Union's policy toward the newly independent nations of the third world. 
Soviet economic aid extensions to the third world, over these two 
decades, reached an estimated sum of $8.7 billion. Less than half of 
this sum ($4.3 billion) has to-date, however, actually been delivered 
to the lesser developed countries. With estimated repayments running 
close to $1.7 billion, the net flow of Soviet aid and grants to the 
lesser developed countries have thus far not exceeded the modest sum 
of $2.5 billion. 1 
Over the same period, in spite of the parsimony of the Soviet 
aid program, the annual trade with the lesser developed countries has 
more than dectupled. 2 The increased economic activity is indicative of 
major changes in the Soviet policy toward the developing nations, and of 
the desire to project the Soviet Union as a major aid and trade partner 
of the lesser developed countries. The promises of economic assistance 
have been used, on the other hand, as a major tool to penetrate foreign 
1u.s. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 
Communist States and Oevelo in Countries: Aid and Trade in 1973 
Research Study RS20 Wash1ngton D.C.: 
October 10, 1972), Table 5. 
2Roger E. Kanet, Soviet Union and the Developing Nations (Baltimore: 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 1. 
'1 
2 
markets and to gain a political foothold in the third world. 3 Through 
these programs the Soviets have succeeded in reducing the Western 
influence and in augmenting their own. 
Much has been written about Soviet economic aid by both the Soviet 
and the Western experts. Most of the published literature is devoted 
to qualitative evaluation of various aid forms (e.g., loans, grants, 
technical assistance, and project aid), and of economic advantages and 
disadvantages to both the donor and the recipient countries. However, 
only a few studies have attempted a quantitative analysis. Most of the 
quantitative studies4 carry out a cross-sectional data analysis which 
is based on three basic assumptions. First, the analysis assumes that 
the countries are homogeneous. The pursuance of heterogeneous politi-
cal, social, and economic philosophies by the recipient countries 
strongly questions the homogeneity assumption. Second, the analysis 
assumes that the relationship identified in the past will persist in the 
future. 5 By assuming that the present policy resembles the past one 
and the future policy will resemble the present one, the analysis fails 
to account for changes in the Soviet aid policy. Third, the cross-
sectional analysis assumes that a large sample size is available. The 
paucity of data makes it enormously difficult to meet this assumption. 
3Robert S. Walters, American and Soviet Aid: A Com arative Anal -
sis (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970 , pp. 6- 8. 
4satish K. Raichur, 11 Determinants of United States and Soviet 
Economic Aid to the Third World 11 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Pittsburgh, 1972); w. J. Klages and F. A. Raffa, "A Note On the Soviet 
Economic Aid to the Lesser Developed Countries," Rivista Internazionale 
(November 1974): 1065-1070. 
5samuel B. Richmond, Statistical Analysis (New York: Ronald Press 
Company, 1964), p. 339. 
3 
The time-series analysis, on the other hand, does not require 
the countries to be homogeneous, does not assume that the past relation-
ships will necessarily persist in the future, and overcomes the require-
-
ment of a large sample size. It should be emphasized that the time-
series analysis, in contrast to cross-sectional analysis, assumes the 
invariance of patterns of change rather than of relationships. It is, 
therefore, well suited to explain time-varying relationships. On the 
basis of these considerations a time-series analysis was deemed to be 
more appropriate for a statistical forecasting of Soviet aid patterns. 
In this study, an attempt is made to determine the political 
rationale of the Soviet economic aid to the lesser developed countries. 
The motivations, nature, and terms of the Soviet economic aid are 
analysed. This analysis will be confined, primarily due to computa-
tional difficulties associated with non-linear models, to the develop-
ment of a linear model. The dependent variable, 11 Soviet economic aid .. 
is regressed against five independent variables which are: Soviet 
exports to an LDC, Soviet imports from the LDC, repayments by the LDC, 
foreign reserve position of the LDC, and per capita GNP of the LDC. 
The countries included in the study are chosen on the basis of data 
availability. Conscious efforts were made to include major recipients 
of the Soviet aid. The term •aid 1 is defined as the world market value, 
less repayments, of Soviet aid deliveries consisting of equipments, 
materials and technical services that are financed through long term 
credits or grants. It excludes the aid commitments on the ground that 
they are mere promises. 
4 
Most of the data is obtained from the Monthly Bulletin of 
Statistics, The U.N. Statistical Year Book, and The International 
Financial Statistics. The aid delivery data are obtained from the 
-.-
Category 16 of official Soviet trade statistics. This category con-
sists of equipments and materials for complete plants, and represents 
the value of technical services as well as material goods supplied by 
the USSR to aid receiving countries. 6 It is assumed that the exports 
of Category 16 goods to lesser developed countries flow under Soviet 
credits. A ratio of $1.05=1 Ruble was used to get the approximate 
aid figures. 
The commonly perceived meanings of aid in general and of the 
Soviet aid in particular are given in Chapter II. This exposition is 
followed by a detail discussion of nature, terms, and motivations of 
the Soviet aid. The development of the mathematical model, and the 
regression analysis technique used to derive the model are presented 
in Chapter III. To account for the influence of qualitative variables 
such as political philosophy, geographical location, and social con-
ditions, dummy variables, also known as binary variables, are employed. 
The results of the study are summarized in Chapter IV. 
6Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 1967) , 
p. 27. 
CHAPTER II 
NATURE, TERMS, AND MOTIVATIONS OF THE SOVIET AID 
Foreign aid is an ambiguous concept that covers a variety of 
transactions between the developed and the developing countries. The 
ambiguity arises from the plurality and complexity of the donor's 
motivations and the recipient's economic constraints. 1 Often the 
motivations underlying the aid are implicit and disguised. Apart 
from the political advantages that may be extracted, the donor derives 
economic benefits which partially or fully compensate for the cost of 
the aid. The benefits are derived through the economic strings 
attached to the aid. Though the strings may not be favorable to the 
recipient country, domestic economic constraints frequently force 
the recipient to accept the terms of aid agreement. 2 
In spite of the ambiguity, an attempt is made to examine the 
commonly perceived meaning of aid in general and of the Soviet aid 
in· particular. This examination is followed by a discussion of the 
growth of the Soviet aid program. Since its inception, two decades 
ago, Soviet aid has assumed many forms. The variety of the forms of 
aid and the underlying motivations constitute the subject matter of 
this chapter. 
1James R. Carter, The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: 
Praeger, 1971), p. 5. 
2Ibid. 
5 
6 
As mentioned before, the term 'aid' does not have a precise defi-
nition. Generically, "it refers to government sponsored flows of 
resources, made available on concessional terms to foreign governments 
either directly (on a bilateral basis) or indirectly (via multilateral 
organizations). 113 John Pincus, however, has attempted to measure and 
quantify aid in terms of the cost to the donor country. 4 Though I.M.D. 
Little, and J.M. Clifford consider •aid' to be an ambiguous concept, 
they define it as the value of subsidy (grant element) implicit in the 
flow of resources. 5 Thus, grants of convertible currency are certainly 
aid to their full face value. Loans on the other hand contain only an 
insignificant element of aid. Several other scholars viewed aid to the 
third world nations in a different way. According to them, aid con-
jures up an ambivalent vision of extended colonialism, patronization, 
consciously cultered dependence on the donor, humanitariansim, and faint 
stirrings of internationalism. 6 It is also viewed as an effort on the 
part of the donor to nurture, preserve and spread the values and rules 
which have evolved within their own national and cultural boundaries. 7 
3oavid Walls, The Charity of the Nations (New York: Basic Books, 
Inc., 1973), p. 3. 
4John A. Pincus, "The Cost of Foreign Aid, .. Review of Economics 
and Statistics," 14 (November 1963): pp. 360-367. 
5James R. Carter, The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: 
Praeger, 1971), p. 22. 
6satish K. Raichur, 11 0etenninants of United States and Soviet 
Economic Aid to the Third World 11 (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Pittsburgh, 1972), p. 1. 
7Ibid. 
7 
This study will restrict itself to an analysis of Soviet aid 
flows to eleven lesser developed countries. 8 Here, Soviet economic 
aid will be defined as the world market value, less repayments, of 
Soviet aid deliveri~ consisting of the equipments, materials and 
technical services that are financed through long term credits or 
grants. The term repayment will be understood as the world market 
value of goods and services returned to the USSR. 
Inception of the Soviet Aid Program 
Until Stalin's death in 1953, the Soviet Union had isolated itself 
from the rest of the world both physically and ideologically. Her 
foreign policy was primarily a means of obtaining the capital goods 
which the Soviet economy could not produce. 9 After Stalin's death, 
there was a dramatic change in the Soviet's foreign policy toward the 
lesser developed countries. The policy was fashioned to appeal to the 
three major aspirations of the lesser developed countries: economic 
development, national independence and a peaceful world in which these 
new nations can grow and prosper. The policy took the concrete shape 
in the form of trade and economic aid agreements. 
Prior to 1955, economic assistance programs were a monopoly of 
the Western powers in general and of the U.S. in particular. 10 In 1955, 
the communist block countries began a conscious effort to break the 
8Eleven LDCs included in this study are: Afghanistan, Ceylon, 
Egypt, India, Iran, Iraq, Mali, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. 
The period covered is 1963 to 1972. 
9James R. Carter, The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: 
Praeger, 1971), p. 4. 
10Ibid~ p. 9. 
8 
Western monopoly on economic assistance to the lesser developed 
countries. Among the communist countries the USSR became by far the 
foremost supplier of aid. 11 Over the years, the Soviets have expanded 
both the size and g_eDgraphic scope of their foreign aid program. For 
the period 1955 to 1973, Soviet aid extensions to the lesser developed 
countries amounted to be $8.7 billion. This sum includes aid deliveries 
of $4.2 billion and estimated repayments of $1.7 billion. The net flow 
of aid and grants was, however, only $2.5 billion (29%).12 The Soviet 
aid deliveries to the eleven lesser developed countries, as mentioned 
previously, are presented in Table 1. The total aid to these countries 
was worth a meager $61.65 million in 1960, whereas it increased to a 
sizable sum of $606.62 million in 1973, see Table 1. 
Nature and Terms of the Soviet Aid 
The Soviet aid program is essentially an extension of normal 
commercial activity. Its main objectives are: the trading of surplus 
goods and services for much needed raw materials, and the creation of 
new markets for future trade extensions.l3 The Soviet Union has thus 
shown a special interest in medium and long term credits for projects 
such as heavy industries and power plants. The loans granted for these 
lJJames R. Carter, The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: 
Praeger, 1971), p. 9. 
12u.s. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 
Communist States and Develo in Countries: Aid and Trade in 1973, 
Researc Study RS20 Was ington D. Government r1nt1ng ce, 
Oct 1 0, 1972) , p. 5. 
13 ( James R. Carter, The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid tlew York: 
Praeger, 1971 ), p. 15. 
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10 
thoroughly examine the feasibility of proposed projects and usually 
explore the local availability of the human and natural resources that 
are required for a particular project. It must be noted that these 
projects pertain t~ .s~ch goods and services that are not locally avail-
able, and are financed through Soviet surplus resources. Such a pecuniary 
scheme is, in effect, equivalent to an exchange of machinery, equipments 
and technical skill for raw materials and other products which the Soviet 
economy badly needs. Though the surplus equipments and technical skills 
could be employed to further their own economic development, the Soviets 
find the utilization of the surplus capacity for the foreign aid more 
profitable than the retooling of resources for the domestic needs. 
Clearly, the role of aid is to create, through trade, new demand for 
the surplus resources which would have remained otherwise unused in 
absence of the trade. 14 
The Soviet aid program is characterized by the aid commitments 
predominantly on the credit basi·s, by the bilateral agreements and by 
the hard terms of trade. Most of the aid is in forms of 12-year loans 
at 2.5 percent rate of interest, and is repayable either in local cur-
rencies or in specified conmodities at fixed prices. 15 The repayments 
start one year after the completion of the project for which the money 
was loaned. Esche'tJing the multilaterization and grant element of the 
Western aid, the Soviets committed virtually all aid bilaterally. Only 
4 percent of the aid commitments, during the period 1955 to 1968, were 
14 ( James R. Carter, The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid New York: 
Praeger, 1971), p. 15. 
15Ibid., p. 27. 
11 
16 in the form of grants. Almost all of the grant aid has been used to 
finance gifts such as a radio station in Conakry, hospitals in Cambodia, 
Nepal and Lebanon, equipments for a technical institute in India, and 
for a technical school in Ethiopia. 17 These gift agreements, mostly 
small and often reciprocal, are more like interest free loans or alterna-
tively like bilateral trade. The reasons for the small ratio of grant 
to the total aid are not very well known. However, it is speculated that 
the objective of the Soviet aid is to maintain permanent relations with 
the recipient country. 18 If the aid were to be advanced in the forms of 
grant this objective would not be accomplished. The contacts generated 
through the grant aid, in contrast to credit aid, would last only the 
period of the implementation of that particular project. Moreover, the 
credit aid is less expensive than the grant aid. 
Financial terms of the Soviet aid program to the third world 
countries are quite uniform. The program continues to carry relatively 
hard terms of aid. Most credits are concentrated on supplying capital 
equipments for relatively large projects in a selected few countries, 
are tied to the purchase of Soviet goods, and are attached with compar-
atively stringent conditions to their credit agreements. We shall 
describe some of these conditions briefly. The prices of the Soviet 
exports are not fixed in general agreements but are negotiated in 
16James R. Carter, The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: 
Praeger, 1971 ) , p. 25. 
17 E. Glovinsky, "Soviet Economic Expensions in Developing Countries," 
Studies on the Soviet Union 1 (November 1961 ): 189. 
18Robert L. Allen, Middle Eastern Economic Relations with t~e So~ · e 
Union, Eastern Euro e, and Main-Land China (Charlottesville: Un1vers1ty 
of Virginia Press, 1958 , p. 10. 
12 
subsequent codicils. The prices are determined according to prevalent 
11 World prices .. , in spite of the fact that Soviet goods are qualitatively 
inferior, and are negotiated separately for each and every project and 
aid category. 19 T~~ ~redits are completely tied to Soviet exports, the 
recipient is forced to buy equipments in future from the USSR. The 
Soviet supplied equipments cannot be replaced by the equipments manu-
factured elsewhere. The Soviet credit covers only the foreign exchange 
cost of the project financed by the Soviet aid program. The recipient 
must meet all accompanying domestic costs. However, on several occasions 
Soviets helped Afghanistan to defray local cost of the aid projects. The 
Soviet aid is provided in the form of rubles, which, not being a convert-
able currency, are good only for the purchase in the USSR. As a normal 
practice, the purchases of the recipient country from the USSR are 
handled by the monopolistic Soviet 11 trade corporations .. which act as 
intermediary between Soviet enterprises and the Soviet aid recipients. 
Consequently, the recipient has a little choice in his selection of 
suppliers for the desired products.2° 
The Soviet aid program, in many respects, resembles trade. If 
~1yint I s21 argument for 11 Vent for SurplUS 11 is applicable to the Soviet 
foreign aid program, it follows that aid is not provided for the 
19Kurt Muller, The Forei n Aid Pro rams of the Soviet Block and 
Communist China: An Ana ysis New York: Wa er, 96 , p. 
20Robert s. Walters, American and Soviet Aid: A Com arative 
Analysis (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
21 R. E. Caves, 11 Vent for Surplus: Models of Trade and Growth,u 
in Economics of Trade and Develo ment, ed. James D. Theberge (New York: 
Wiley, 1968 , pp. 211-229. 
13 
humanitarian reasons. The aid is then a means of trading surplus goods 
for much needed imports, e.g., raw materials at advantageous terms. 
Although the USSR has attached some stringent financial strings to her 
aid program, on th~ _ ~hole, they are fewer than that of the Western econ-
ernie aid program. The strings seem to be designed primarily to minimize 
the burden of aid giving and to continue contacts with the countries of 
the third world. 
Motivations of the Soviet Aid Program 
Since financial assistance is a complex phenomenon, the motivations 
of aid are numerous. Aid may be provided for political, economic, or 
humanitarian reasons, neither two of which are mutually exclusive. A 
donor country may seek political and economic advantages from the rec1p-
ient country. Some specific examples of economic advantages derived by 
the donor are: dumping the surplus manufactured goods, selling the 
obsolete technology, purchasing raw materials at a price lower than the 
prevailing world market price. 
Historically, different aid motivations have been predominant at 
different times. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
subsidies were used to manipulate the balance of power. 22 Colonization 
saw the use of aid as a prop to support the power positions both polit-
ically and militarily. The development of the recipient country was 
considered to be neither a necessary nor a sufficient criterion for 
aid. In the post-colonization period, most of the emerging countries 
22 r.M.D. Little and J.r~. Clifford, International Aid (Chicago: 
Aldine, 1965), p. 22. 
14 
of the third world had an intolerable level of economic development. 
The emergence of these countries emphasized the disparities in the dis-
tribution of wealth between the Western and the Afro-Asian countries. 
The striking economic disparities provided the foundation for the 
political demand to extract economic aid from the U.S.A., USSR, and the 
other advanced countries. During the late 19so•s, the political demand 
lead to the acceptance of economic development as a paramount motivation 
for aid. Within a decade, the aid program helped to evolve the concepts 
of international community and of welfare beyond the borders of the 
nation state. 23 
The political and military climate which prevailed in the inter-
national arena since the World War II, made economic aid attractive 
to both the donor and to the recipient as an instrument of furthering 
their national interests. The two prominent donors, the U.S.A. and the 
USSR, recognized that the dollar and the ruble and not the display of 
military prowess would enhance their influence in the lesser developed 
countries. 24 Soon the aid programs grew visibly like mushrooms without 
definite directions. 
We shall analyze the motivations of the Soviet aid from the stand-
point of these views. It has been felt that the motivations, both 
economic and non-economic, of the Soviet aid are far more complex and 
numerous than that of the Western aid. In addition, the paucity of the 
23satish K. Raichur, 11 Determinants of United States and Soviet 
Economic Aid to the Third \~orld 11 (Ph.D dissertation, University o 
Pittsburgh, 1972), p. 3. 
24Robert s. Walters, American and Soviet Aid: A Com arative 
Analysis (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970 , p. 5. 
15 
reliable information severely hampers a thorough analysis of the 
motivations. Nevertheless, the principle traits such as expension of 
the commercial trade, conquest of the foreign markets, and moulding of 
the third world econemies can be deduced from the manner in which the 
Soviet aid is implemented. 
Political Motivations 
The combination of aid and trade is employed to gain political 
influence in and over the lesser developed countries with whom the USSR 
had no relations previously. Prior to 1955, the diplomatic relations 
between the Soviet Union and the lesser developed countries were 
virtually non-existent, and the Soviet political influence was almost 
absent. 25 The combination of aid and trade had proved itself to be quite 
powerful for establishing her political influence in these countries. 
Once the influence is gained, the Russians try to create goodwill through 
their aid extensions. To enhance their political influence through the 
aid programs, the Soviets create a feeling in the recipient country that 
the aid agreements are advantageous to both the recipient and the USSR. 
They demonstrate that the Soviet intentions are honorable, the equipments 
are sophisticated, and the technology is most advanced. The USSR con-
vinces through these agreements that the recipient country can enter 
into the regularized relations without the fear of compromising her 
newly gained independence in the process. The ultimate motive is to 
present herself as a first rate power rivaling the U.S. economically, 
25 Ibid., p. 31 
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technically and militarily. Like the U.S., the Soviet Union hoped to be 
perceived by the lesser developed countries as a champion of their aspir-
ations for economic development and independence. 26 
The second visible political motivation is to exert short-term 
political influence on the domestic policies of the lesser developed 
countries. To accomplish this goal, aid is provided in a form which 
moulds the public opinion in favor of communism. A specific example is 
the concentration of the aid in the state sector to strengthen the role 
of government in national economic and political development. 27 
The desire to see these lesser developed countries adopting a 
neutralist foreign policy constitutes third political motivation. The 
USSR unreservedly supports the espousals of neutralism, anti-colonialism, 
and anti-Westernism. An overwhelming proportion of the total Soviet 
assistance flows to the neutralist states. This fact is convincing 
evidence of the Soviet desire to encourage them in their adherence to 
neutralist foreign policy. The unreserved political support and the 
overwhelming aid strengthen the bargaining power of the neutralist 
states and enables them to exercise their newly gained independence. 
These nations view the Soviet Union as an emancipator who gave them long 
cherished national prestige. Such an obligatory feeling generates 
tremendous goodwill, in the masses, for the Soviet Union. 28 
26 Ibid., p. - 32 
27 Ibid • , p. 33 
28 Ibid. 
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Anti-Westernism and Soviet Security 
In the Soviet assistance programs, anti-Westernism plays a role 
very similar to the one played by anti-communism in the American aid 
programs. The aid .and trade have always been regarded as effective 
weapons to impair the influence of the West and to enhance her own 
influence. Every Soviet aid agreement is a deliberate attempt to brand 
U.S. aid programs as exploitative and anti-developmental in nature, and 
dangerous to the recipient country. Since projects financed through the 
American aid programs are small in scale, non-industrial in nature, and 
carry a higher rate of interest, they are portrayed as exploitative and 
29 
non-developmental. The portrayal is sharpened by providing the aid at 
a comparatively lower rate of interest and for the large scale manu-
facturing industries. On several occasions, when the Western powers 
refused to provide capital for agricultural or heavy industrial projects, 
the Russians quickly and eagerly agreed to finance these projects. 30 
The Bokaro Steel Mill in India and the Aswan dam in Egypt are two of 
many such instances. 
To establish her own influence and to lessen the Western influence, 
the USSR has stepped in to relieve serious problems faced by the certain 
lesser developed countries. When the products manufactured by these 
countries remained unsold either because of boycott by the major buyers 
or because of excessiveness in the world market, Soviets were quick to 
rescue them by buying their products and in return won their goodwill. 
29 Ibid 
. ' 
p. 34 
30Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Praeger, 
1967), pp. 78-79. 
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Soviets' purchase of Iceland•s fish boycotted by Britain, and of Cuban 
sugar boycotted by the U.S. are two specific examples. These favors 
enhanced the Soviet influence and reduced the Western influence. The 
-.-
quest for the world influence continues to spur economic relations with 
the lesser developed countries. This is best illustrated by President 
Anwar Sadat•s charge that 11 The USSR has used the supply of weapons and 
ammunitions to his country as an instrument of policy leverage 11 • 31 
The concern for the military security translates into encourage-
ment of neutralism in the third world and into extension of aid to the 
U.S. allies bordering the Eastern European countries. The encouragement 
of neutralism tends to preclude effectively the formation of an alliance 
between a lesser developed country and the West. The policy is designed 
to convince Western oriented countries that the USSR does not constitute 
a threat to their independence and projects herself as non-intervention-
ist.32 
Humanitarian Motive 
Though humanitarian considerations may play a part in the determi-
nation of aid allocations, their importance relative to economic or 
security considerations is unclear. The Soviets manifest that it is the 
duty of a socialist country to help a lesser developed country who has 
suffered at the hands of colonialism. The aid program is primarily 
based on the principals of anti-Westernism, and anti-colonialism. The 
USSR advances aid on comparatively lower rates of interest and in the 
31 The New York Times, 22 June 1974. 
32Robert s. Walters, American and Soviet Aid: A Comgarative 
Analysis (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 197 ), p. 36. 
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industrial sectors of the recipient country. 33 However, it is aimed 
to serve her political interests. The humanitarian considerations are 
of secondary importance. 
-.-
Economic Benefits 
The economic benefits derived from the aid provide a lucrative 
motivation for aid and trade with the lesser developed countries. The 
aid extensions caused tremendous increase in the volume of trade with 
the lesser developed countries. The Soviet trade with these countries 
grew on an annual average of 9 percent during 1967 to 1971, 41 percent 
in 1972, and 54 percent in 1973, see Table 8 and 9 of Appendix. This 
growth reflects the rising aid deliveries to the lesser developed 
countries and growing repayments to the USSR by these countries. 
The primary economic motivation behind trade through aid programs 
is to import raw materials and agricultural goods, and to export indus-
trial and capital goods. In conjunction with the cost phenomenon, 
discussed later on, this type of trade heavily favors the USSR. Due to 
the structure of Soviet economic investment and development, the rela-
tive cost of production in the USSR is higher in the non-industrial 
sector than it is in the industrial sector, particularly in heavy 
industry. 34 This factor suggests that the Soviet Union can enlarge her 
total product by exporting increased quantities of manufactured goods 
33v. Rimalov, 11 Soviet Assistance to Underdeveloped Countries, .. 
International Affairs 9 {1959): 24. 
34Robert L. Allen, .. Economic Motives in Soviet Foreign Trade 
Po 1 icy,.. Southern Economic Journa 1 25 (October 1958) : 193-196. 
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and by importing greater quantities of raw materials and agricultural 
products. In addition, the USSR is able to sell her manufactured goods 
which are markedly inferior to comparable Western goods, available in 
the world market. 35--This apparent falacy is explained by the in-
capacity of the lesser developed countries to pay for the superior 
' 
goods manufactured by the Western powers. This state of helplessness 
is decisively exploited by the USSR to create markets for her products. 
The aid extensions on easy te~ms serve as inducement to switch to 
inferior Soviet products. 
In summary, the nature and motivations are far more complex and 
numerous than they are believed to be. However, there are certain 
definite traits which can be immediately discerned. The aid program is 
eclectic and pragmatic in nature and is essentially a political tool. 
The USSR may simply be attempting to establish a foothold in the third 
world through the association with development aspirations of lesser 
developed countries. 
35carole A. Sawyer, Communist Trade With Developing Countries 
1955-65 (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 42. 
CHAPTER III 
AN ANALYSIS -OF THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE USER 
The Soviet Union has proffered aid to a large number of countries. 
Geographically, these aid-receiving countries are located in every 
region of the third world - Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the 
Mediterranean. But the economic, humanitarian, the political factors 
on which the aid is based are not self-evident. The contention is 
that the Soviet aid is an extension of normal commercial trade. This 
contention is supported py the fact that only 4% of the total aid is in 
the form of grants. 1 It is further contended that only a negligible 
fraction of aid is provided on humanitarian grounds, and that low per 
capita income is not a criterion for the allocation of aid, and that 
non-economic factors, e.g. political, social, and geographical, heavily 
influence aid-giving. 
To support these contentions the Soviet aid shall be analyzed first 
on the premise that the aid is essentially a function of economic and 
humanitarian considerations. Second, an analysis will be presented 
based on the hypothesis that non-economic factors, in addition to 
economic and -humanitarian, exert substantial influence on aid-giving. 
If the first part of the analysis fails to reveal the existence of a 
uniform Soviet political economy toward the lesser developed countries, 
1James R. Carter, The Net Cost of Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: 
Praeger, 1971), p. 25. 
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we shall attempt to group the various aid-receiving countries. Each of 
the groups will be uniquely identifiable by a common Soviet economic 
and/or humanitarian policy adopted toward them. The second part of 
the analysis will then be used to discern, by regrouping the countries 
and by comparing the regrouping with previous grouping, the extent of 
the influence of the non-economic factors on aid giving. 
The first part of the analysis concerns the construction of a 
linear model which will explain the dependence of aid, the dependent 
variable in our model, on exports, imports and repayments, the economic 
variables, and on foreign reserve position and per capita GNP, the 
humanitarian variables. Since stepwise regression analysis permits us 
to construct the model recursively, and to include independent vari-
ables, in the model, in order of their importance, this regression 
procedure was used to develop the first model. To determine the 
dependence of aid on non-economic factors, a second model is developed. 
Since 11 non-economic factors .. is a qualitative variable, it is intro-
duced in Model 2 through dummy variables, also called binary variables 
because each of these variables is either unity or zero. The use of 
dummy variables to measure the effect of these factors, and the actual 
procedure for inclusion are explained later in this Chapter. Once the 
model is formulated, stepwise regression analysis is used to retain 
only those variables, in the model, which are statistically significant. 
Formulation of Model 1 
Mathematically, the linear relationship of Soviet aid with 
economic and humanitarian variables is characterized by the model: 
23 
(1) 
where 
Y denotes the _ ~oviet aid deliveries in millions of U.S. dollars, 
x1 denotes Soviet net exports to an LDC, 
X2 denotes Soviet net imports from the LDC, 
X3 denotes repayments to the USSR from the LDC, 
x4 denotes foreign reserve position of the LDC, 
x5 denotes per capita GNP of the LDC, and 
U denotes the error term. 
Explanation of the Variables 
We have included three economic variables in Model 1. These 
variables are r~cognized indicators of a country•s economic development 
and progress. The best estimate of Soviet aid deliveries to the lesser 
developed countries is found in the category 16 of the official trade 
statistics. 2 This category consists of equipment and material for 
complete plants, and represents the value of technical services as well 
as material goods supplied by the USSR to aid-receiving countries. 3 
This type of export is a unique indicator of the Soviet aid deliveries 
to the lesser developed countries, because unlike exports of machinery 
and food stuffs these deliveries are financed through Soviet credit. 
This category does not include the equipment and material supplied 
under aid agreements. Consequently, category 16 does not represent the 
2Marshall I. Goldman, Soviet Foreign Aid (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1967), p. 27. 
3Ibid. 
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total aid deliveries. However, these data give us the most reliable 
estimate of the Soviet aid deliveries to the lesser developed 
countries. 4 
Soviet net exports to the lesser developed countries are computed 
by subtracting the commercial exports of the USSR from the aid delivery 
data of category 16. The commercial exports data were obtained from 
two sources.
5 Most of the Soviet exports to the lesser developed 
countries are of the capital equipments for the construction of new 
buildings. Since the USSR is a heavily industrialized country, it 
appears that these exports constitute the means of dumping their surplus 
industrial capacity, and of obtaining much needed raw materials. We, 
therefore, expect a positive relationship between Soviet aid deliveries 
and Soviet net exports. Soviet net imports to the lesser developed 
countries are computed by subtracting repayments from the flow of 
imports. Imports data were obtained from the same two sources which 
were used for export data. Soviet imports from the lesser developed 
countries are mainly in the form of raw materials consisting of natural 
rubber, wool, spun cotton, citrus fruit, coca, hides and skins, and 
iron and other ores. 6 We, therefore, expect a positive relationship 
between aid and Soviet net imports. The USSR prefers to receive raw 
4Robert S. Walters, American and Soviet Aid: A Com arative 
Analysis (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 19 0 , p. 257. 
5u.s. Department of State. Bureau of Intelligence and Research, 
Communist States and Develo in Countries: Aid and Trade in 1968-1972, 
Research Study Washington D.C.: Government Printing 9ffice ; V~ss 
Vassilev, Polic in the Soviet Block on Aid to Develo 1n Countr1es 
(Paris: OECD, 1969 , pp. 96-99. 
6Ibid., pp. 48-49. 
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materials rather than repayments in convertible currencies. The 
repayments usually start one year after the completion of the project 
for which aid drawings were made, and are spread over a period of 12 
years. The repayments are calculated on the basis of an annual interest 
rate of 2.5% and of 12 equal installments. 
The foreign reserve position of the lesser developed countries 
and the per capita GNP are included as the two humanitarian variables. 
The inclusion of foreign reserve position can be justified on the 
grounds that the more backward a country is the poorer is its foreign 
reserve position. If the USSR is providing aid on humanitarian grounds, 
the poorer the foreign reserve position of a country is, the higher 
should be deliveries of aid. Therefore, an inverse relationship 
between these two variables is expected. The foreign reserve position 
will be measured as the dollar value of gold holdings, foreign exchange, 
special drawing rights (SDR}, and reserve position in International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). The data were gathered from U.N. Monthly Bulletin 
of Statistics. The per capita gross national product (GNP) is used 
as a measure of poverty. Humanitarian consideration, therefore, dic-
tates that aid should be based on per capita GNP and need. Explicitly, 
the lower the per capita GNP of a country, the higher the aid deliver-
ies should be. Per capita GNP data were obtained from the World Trade 
Expenditures and Arms Trade. 7 
7u.s. Department of State, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, World Militar Ex enditures and Arms Trade 1963-73 (Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974 , pp. 20-60. 
26 
The summary of the expected relationships between the criterion 
and each of the five explanatory variables is given in Table 2. 
DeEendent Variable 
Soviet Aid Deliveries 
the LDC's Y 
Soviet Aid Deliveries 
the LDC's Y 
Soviet Aid Deliveries 
the LDC's Y 
Soviet Aid Deliveries 
the LDC's Y 
Soviet Aid Deliveries 
the LDC's Y 
TABLE 2 
EXPECTED RELATIONSHIPS 
Independent Variables 
to Soviet Net Exports xl 
to Soviet Net Imports x2 
to Repayments to the USSR x3 
to Foreign Reserve 
Position x4 
to Per capita GNP x5 
Methodology 
Sign for Expected 
Relationships 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
The theory of quantitative prediction of economic relationships 
and of statistical analysis and inference is based on the development 
of a dynamic model under uncertainty. The parameters of the model are 
estimated from the empirical observations of the values of economic 
variables in the model. The dynamic nature of the Model 1 and the 
prediction of Soviet aid policy toward the lesser developed countries 
makes it imperative that the economic variables are observed over some 
time interval. In other words, a time-series analysis is a must for 
the development of a dynamic model. In addition, the time-series 
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analysis involves the study of one or at the best only a few countries.8 
Since we also are interested in analyzing Soviet political economy for 
only a few lesser d~v~loped countries, time-series analysis is deemed 
to be appropriate. The reasons for the rejection of cross-sectional 
analysis were stated previously in Chapter 1. 
The first step in model development is the selection of a pro-
cedure which would permit the inclusion of only statistically signifi-
cant variables. Combined with the lack of a clear a priori model of 
Soviet aid behavior, the above consideration suggests the use of step-
wise regression analysis method. This method allows the ranking of 
-
explanatory variables according to their relative contributions to 
the regression sum-of-squares. Essentially, this method computes a 
sequence of regression equations, at each step adding or deleting an 
independent variable. The criterion for adding or deleting an 
independent variable can be stated eventually in terms of error sum-
of-squares, coefficients of partial correlations, or •F• statistics. 
Given a set of independent variables x1, x2, ... , Xn' the stepwise 
algorithm includes in the model first that independent variable, x1, 
which is most correlated with the dependent variable Y. This variable 
X. accounts for the largest proportion in the variation of Y. The 
1 
regression sum-of-squares (SSR) is, of course, independent of the 
order in which the dependent variables are introduced. 
8satish K. Raichur, .. Determinants of United States and Soviet 
Economic Aid to the Third World .. (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Pittsburgh, 1972), p. 79. 
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Estimates of Model 1 Parameters 
For each of the eleven countries the parameters of the Model 1 
were computed by implementing the multiple regression program on IBM 
360/65 computer. The parameter values, taken from the computer output, 
are given in Table 3. The tabular form was preferred to avoid clutter-
ing up our discussion with eleven regression equations, and to facili-
tate comparison of various parameters. Table 3 also contains values 
of 'F 1 statistics, the standard error of each estimate (STE), and 
coefficient of determination R2. The rankings of the independent 
variables are shown in Table 4. 
On the basis of the tabulated values of parameter estimates and 
the •F• statistics, we can make several important observations. Some 
of these observations are conclusive while others need further corrobor-
ation. Except for India and Mali, the rest of the nine models are 
statistically significant. However, the number of significant explana-
tory variables varies from one for U.A.R. to three for Iran and 
Pakistan. The order in which these variables appear in different 
models is not the same for all models (refer to Table 4). The lack 
of a consistent ranking suggests that there is no single factor which 
can be considered as the criterion for Soviet aid-giving. It then 
appears that the Soviet Union does not have a uniform and consistent 
policy for aid-giving. 
The dependence of Soviet aid on Soviet net exports is insignif -
cant in cases of Afghanistan, Ceylon, Egypt, and Mali. By looking at 
the 'F' ratios, we can see that this variable is the most significant 
in Iraq's model and the least significant in the equation of Syria. 
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Soviet aid has a negative relationship with net exports for India, 
Iraq, Pakistan, Tunisia, and Turkey. The negative relationship predicts 
that Soviet exports are not increasing as the aid deliveries are 
increasing. If the 'Vent for Surplus• hypothesis were true, the 
relationship would have been positive. It then appears that the 
Soviets are not advancing aid to dump their surplus capacity. Only 
for Iran and Syria this relationship is positive. Moreover, the 
contribution of this variable is very small in the case of Syria. 
Soviet net imports from the lesser developed countries have been 
deleted from the model of Egypt. There is a negative relationship 
between Soviet aid deliveries and Soviet net imports for Afghanistan, 
Iran, Iraq, Mali, Syria, and Tunisia. The negative relationship indi-
cates that Soviet net imports are not increasing as Soviet aid deliver-
ies are increasing, and that Soviet aid deliveries are not aimed to 
obtain raw materials. Though this relationship is positive for Ceylon, 
India, Pakistan, and Turkey, the contribution of net imports in 
explaining the aid dependence is insignificant. Consequently, it can 
not be concluded that the Soviets are delivering aid to obtain raw 
materials. 
One possible explanation of our failure to arrive at a conclusion 
lies in the fact that the Soviets prefer repayments in the form of 
raw materials rather than in hard currencies. Since repayment are a 
definite form of imports, it would be revealing to consider the rela-
tionship between aid and repayments. It follows from Table 3 that 
there is a significant positive relationship between Soviet aid 
deliveries and repayments for Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Tunisia, and ur e · 
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TABLE 4 
RANKING OF EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Countries First Second Third 
Afghanistan bs b4 b2 
Ceylon b2 b3 
Egypt bs b4 
India b4 b2 bs 
Iran b3 bl b2 
Iraq b4 bl b2 
Mali b3 b2 b4 
Pakistan b3 bs bl 
Syria b4 b3 b2 
Tunisia bl b2 b3 
Turkey bl b3 bs 
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The positive relationship implies that as aid deliveries are increas-
ing, repayments are also increasing. Though a negative relationship 
does exist between aid and repayments for Mali and Ceylon, it is 
statistically insignificant. The predominance of the positive rela-
tionships points out that Soviets are importing raw materials in the 
disguised form of repayments, and that these imports increase in 
direct proportion to an increase in aid deliveries. 
The relationship between the foreign reserve position and the aid 
is positive for Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey. The posi-
tive relationship implies that the better the foreign reserve position 
of a country is, the higher is the aid inflow; and that, the aid is 
advanced neither on the humanitarian ground nor on a 11 Sincere desire" 
to assist the poverty ridden lesser developed countries. However, this 
contention is not confirmed by the evenly distributed relationship 
between per capita GNP, a humanitarian variable, and the Soviet aid 
deliveries. If aid were committed on humanitarian considerations, the 
relationship between Soviet aid, and the humanitarian variable, per 
capita GNP, would have been negative. 9 
Estimates of Model 2 Parameters 
The derivation of Model 1 was based on the assumption that the 
variables included in the model are real, continuous and quantitative. 
Qualitative variables such as political influence and regional proxim-
ity were excluded on the assumption that these variables do not 
9It should be noted that the value of the coefficient b~ is large 
because a small valued variable, per capita GNP, is regressea on a large 
valued dependent variable- aid,.and that this large yalue should not be 
misinterpreted to mean that a1d 1s based on human1tar1an considerations. 
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influence Soviet aid. To test the validity of the latter assumption, 
aid will be modeled as a function of economic, humanitarian and non-
economic variables. B~ing qualitative in nature, the last variables• 
influence cannot be measured in numbers. In absence of measurement the 
best one can do is to include a qualitative variable as a classifactory, 
and therefore discrete, variable. A classifactory variable is also 
called an indicator, or a dummy variable. Usually, a qualitative 
variable takes only two values - zero and one. For this reason, it 
is also known as binary variable. 
If the ensuing analysis reveals that the countries can be divided 
into groups, i.e., the differential coefficients are statistically 
significant, we shall conclude that non-economic considerations do 
influence aid-giving and that a uniform policy does not exist. On the 
other hand, if the differential coefficients are statistically in-
significant, we shall infer that Soviet Union does have a uniform 
policy for all countries. 
To facilitate the mathematical formulation of the model each 
country, with the sole exception of Egypt, which is numbered zero, is 
assigned an index number alphabetically. Explicitly, Afghanistan is 
country number one and Turkey is number ten. Using the above index-
ing scheme Model 2 can be stated as: 
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Y = ba,o + ba,l + ba,2 + ba,3 + ba,4 
+ bo,s + bo,s + bo,7 + bo,a + bo,9 + bo,lo 
+ { bl ,0 +. 0, , 1 °1 + bl ,2°2 + bl , 3°3 + bl ,4° 4 + 
bl,5°5 + bl,6°6 + bl,7°7 + b1,a0a + 
bl,9°9 + b1,10°10} Xl 
+{ b2,0 + b2,1°1 + b2,2°2 + b2,3°3 + 
b2,4°4 + b2,5°5 + b2,6°6 + b2,7°7 + 
b2,8°8 + b2,9°9 + b2,10°10} X2 
+{ b3,0 + b3,1°1 + b3,2°2 + b3,3°3 + 
b3,4°4 + b3,5°5 + b3,6°6 + b3,7°7 + 
b3,8°8 + b3,9°9 + b3,10°10} X3 
+ {b4,0 + b4,1°1 + b4,2°2 + b4,3°3 + 
b4,4°4 + b4,5°5 + b4,6°6 + b4,7°7 + 
b4,8°8 + b4,9°9 + b4,10°10} X4 + U (2) 
In the above equation, the first subscript refers to an inde-
pendent variable and the second refers to the number assigned to a 
country. Accordintly, bo,o• b1,0, b2,0, b3,0, b4,0 are the intercept 
and slope coefficients of respective xi•s for Egypt; bO,l' b0,2, ... , 
bO,lO are the differential intercepts for various countries; bl,l' 
b1 ,2, • • • , b1 ,l 0 are the s 1 ope coefficients of x1 ; b2, p b2 ,2, .. • , 
b2,10 are the slope coefficients of x2; b3,1, b3,2 •.. , b3,10 are the 
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differential slope coefficients of X3; and b4,1, b4,2, ... , b4,10 
are the differential slope coefficients of x4. 
The various D's are defined as: 
={1, if the observation belongs to Afghanistan 
o, 
0, otherwise. 
{
1, if the observation belongs to Ceylon, 
02 = 
0, otherwise. 
{
1, if the observation belongs to India, 
0 = 3 0, otherwise. 
{
1, if the observation belongs to Iran, 
0 = 4 0, otherwise. 
{
1, if the observation belongs to Iraq, 
0 = 5 0, otherwise. 
{
1, if the observation belongs to Mali, 
0 = 6 0, otherwise. 
{
1, if the observation belongs to Pakistan, 
07 = 
0, otherwise. 
{
1, if the observation belongs to Syria, 
D = 8 0, otherwise. 
{
1, if the observation belongs to Tunisia, 
D = 9 0, otherwise. 
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{
1, if the observation belongs to Turkey, 
D = 10 0, otherwise. 
Equation (2) can be written compactly as: 
4 
Y= ~ 
i=O 
10 
~ b .• D. X. + U j=O , ,J J , ' (3) 
where D0=1 and x0=1. The index i denotes the number of independent 
variable whereas j refers to the number by which a country is identi-
fied. The independent variables Xi's were defined earlier on page 23. 
The coefficients bO,O' b1 ,O' ... , b4,0 denote the intercept and the 
slope coefficients of xi•s for Egypt, respectively. The coefficients 
bi,j•s, j10, denote the differential intercepts and differential slope 
coefficients10 (;ro) of X;'s for the rest of the ten countries. The 
binary-valued variables Dj' j=l ,2,3, ... , 10 are defined as follows: 
D. = { 1 , if observation be 1 ongs . to country j, 
J 0, otherwise. (4) 
To compute the estimates of b .. , the aid data given in Table 7 
1 ,J 
of Appendix were used. The Soviet aid deliveries were regressed on 
net exports, net imports, repayments, and foreign reserve position. 
Following Gujarati•s11 approach a regression program was implemented 
10oamodar, Gujarati, "Use of Dummy Variables in Testing for 
Equality Between Sets of Coefficients in Linear Regressions: A 
Generalization, .. The American Statistician {December 1970): 18-22. 
11 Ibid. 
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on the computer. The computer output consisting of all intercepts 
and slope coefficients is reproduced below: 
Y = 44.25423 ~ _.2SX 1 + .40X2 + .49X3 
+ [ -9 • 4601 * -49 . 50 2 + 168. 920 3 +41 • 90 4 
-73.7405 -41.2706 -38.8107 -51.9108 
-41 • 6 2 D 9 -50 . 3 40 l O J 
+{.3*02 -.5403 + 1.3404 -1.4205 
-.03D7* + .38*o8 -.17*o10 } x1 
+ { -2.1701 -. 09*03 -1.6804 
-1 . 0205 -. 6908 * -. 66*09 + • 31 *01 O } x2 
+{-0.7601 -.8803 + 3.0904 
+.7*o8 + 6.41o10 } x3 
+{.81*01 -.1203 + .24o5 + .4o8 } x4 (5} 
The first four coefficients on the right hand side of (5} are the 
intercept and the three ~lope coefficients of the Model. The differen-
tial intercepts are enclosed in square brackets whereas the differential 
slope coefficients for xi•s are enclosed in curly brackets. The 
asterisk* identifies the differential coefficients which are not 
statistically significant at 5% level of significance. 
Since statistically significant differential intercepts and slope 
coefficients are present in (5}, the individual regression equations 
differ from country to country. The absence of a common regression 
equation for all eleven countries points out that non-economic 
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motivations exercise substantial influence on the relationship of aid 
with economic and humanitarian motives. This evidence confirms our 
earlier contention that non-economic factors such as political con-
siderations, regional proximity, and social conditions are important 
determinants of Soviet aid. 
The order in which the xi•s enter an individual regression equa-
tion is shown in Table 5. It emerges from this table that x3, repay-
ments, is the second most important explanatory variable for all 
countries. To aid our interpretation, we have tabulated the individual 
regression equations for all countries. These equations are given in 
Table 6. The tabulated coefficient values, for each country, were 
obtained by adding the appropriate differential intercept and slope 
coefficients to intercept and slope coefficients, respectively. For 
example, the intercept b0,1=34.78956 for Afghanistan is calculated 
by adding the differential intercept value -9.46464 to the common 
intercept b0,0=44.25423. 
The results obtained from the regression analysis show that most 
of the countries display negative relationship between aid and net 
exports, and that Soviet exports are decreasing as aid deliveries are 
increasing. The negative relationship also indicates that Soviet aid 
is not primarily used as a means of venting surplus industrial capa-
city. Soviet aid and net imports exhibit both positive and negative 
relationships. Since the relationships are about evenly divided 
between the countries, it is not possible to make guaranteed state-
ments about the dependence of aid on imports. 
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TABLE 5 
RANKING OF THE EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Countries First Second Third 
0 Egypt x2 Xl x3 
1 Afghani stan xl x2 ,x3 x4 
2 Ceylon X2 x3 
3 India X4 x3 x, 
4 Iran Xl x3 x2 
5 Iraq X4 x2 x, 
6 Mali x2 x, x3 
7 Pakistan X2 x3 
8 Syria X4 x2 
9 Tunisia Xl x3 
10 Turkey X3 
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Soviet aid shows positive dependence on repayments for all 
countries except Afghanistan and India. This positive dependence can 
be interpreted to mean that the Soviet Union is advancing aid to 
obtain raw materials. The foreign reserve position is statistically 
significant only for a small minority of the countries. For these 
countries, foreign reserve position is positively related to aid, 
supporting the contention that aid is not commited on humanitarian 
grounds. 
In summary, two linear models were developed to explain the 
extent to which Soviet aid is dependent on economic rather than on 
humanitarian and other non-economic factors. Specifically, Model 1 
establishes a relationship between exports, imports, repayments, 
foreign reserve position, per capita GNP and aid. The model asserts 
that Soviet aid is being advanced mainly to obtain raw materials in the 
disguised form of repayments. The hypothesis that Soviet aid is a 
means of dumping surplus manufacturing capacity in the third world 
finds little or no support while the premise that aid is not governed 
by humanitarian considerations is strongly confirmed. It should be 
~ 
emphasized that this model ignores the dependence of Soviet aid on 
non-economic factors. To overcome this inadequacy non-economic factors 
such as political motivations, regional proximity and social conditions 
were introduced as a qualitative variable in Model 2. The presence 
of a large number of statistically significant differential coefficients 
proves that aid is definitely a function of non-economic factors. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSIONS 
Two linear dynamic econometric models were constructed to predict 
the functional dependence of Soviet aid on economic, humanitarian, and 
non-economic, such as political, geographical and social, variables. 
The first model assumes with complete certainty that there is no rela-
tionship between aid and non-economic variables. Though this assump-
tion of perfect knowledge leads to a simple model, in reality this 
relationship is not known with complete certainty, beforehand. The un-
certainty is accounted for in the second model wherein we enter the 
non-economic considerations as an additional predicant. The qualita-
tive nature of the predicant forced us to include it as a dummy 
variable rather than as a regular (continuous) variable. 
These two models together provide adequate evidence for either 
acceptance or rejection of most of our hypotheses, stated earlier. One 
of our hypotheses was that the Soviet aid is not advanced on humani-
tarian grounds to assist the poor countries of the third world. Model 1 
predicts that the relationships between aid and the humanitarian vari-
able, the foreign reserve position (FRP) of a lesser developed country, 
is positive. The positive direction implies that the poorer a country 
is, the lesser is the aid given to it. This evidence strongly suggests 
that aid is, indeed, not extended on humanitarian basis. It was, also, 
hypothesized that the Soviets are using aid as a vehicle to dump their 
surplus industrial capacity in the third world markets. The existence 
45 
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of the statistically significant negative relationship between aid 
and net exports for a number of countries tends to counter our 
hypothesis. In fact, the negativity of the relationship suggests that 
an increase in aid is accompanied by a relative decrease in exports 
of manufactured goods and equipments. Similarly, the models do not 
uphold our premise that Soviet aid is designed to obtain much needed 
raw materials from the lesser developed countries. 
Based on Model 1 several other important observations can be made. 
The absence of a common regression equation points out that the Soviet 
Union does not have a uniform aid policy for all or any sub-group of 
countries. The random ranking of explanatory variables (refer to 
Table 4 page 33) emphasizes that no single factor plays a dominant role 
in aid-giving. The number of statistically significant variables enter-
ing an equation differs from country to country. This fact further 
underscores the lack of uniform policy. Overall, the model is very 
effective in explaining the variations in aid. 
Finally, we contended that the aid is heavily influenced by non-
economic motivations. This contention is strongly supported by Model 2. 
The presence of a large number of statistically significant differen-
tial intercepts and slopes demonstrates unequivocally that aid is 
governed by non-economic considerations. The non-existence of a common 
regression equation indicates that the effect of non-economic factors 
on aid varies from one country to another, and that the Soviet Union 
does not adhere to a common political economy. 
A comparison of the two models reveals that they are identical in 
their acceptance or rejection of our contentions. Together they 
47 
underscore the non-uniform dependence of Soviet aid behavior on non-
economic and economic factors. The two models differ in the rankings 
of explanatory variables (see Tables 4 and 5). Model 1 is noted for 
the lack of any consistent ranking of predicants. In contrast, •re-
payments• appears as the second most important variable in Model 2. 
However, we cannot explain its significance. It should also be noted 
that Model 2 has, as expected, a higher •F• statistics than Model 1. 
The improvement in •F• ratio is, of course, attributed to the inclusion 
of the qualitative variable in Model 2. 
Though the linear models were quite adequate for our analysis, it 
is felt that a more realistic model can be constructed by first elimi-
nating the trend, equivalently, removing the autocorrelation, from the 
original data and working with the deviations from the trend. Since 
project aid at any given time is often functionally related to previous 
project commitments, an autoregressive model will be more suitable 
for the characterization of Soviet aid. Yet another important modi-
fication would be to formulate a nonlinear model - nonlinear in para-
meters as distinguished from polynomial type models. Some initial 
efforts were expanded in the development of a nonlinear model. These 
efforts were later abandoned for some computational difficulties. 
However, a devoted researcher, given sufficient time, should be able 
to overcome these difficulties. 
APPENDIX 
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